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ON FORMALISM; ON PROGRESS IN THE ARTS

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On May 7, 1824, Delacroix, at work on his *Massacre at Scio*, made this entry in his journal:

My picture is beginning to develop a rhythm, a powerful spiral momentum. I must make the most of it. I must keep that good black, that happy, rather dirty quality, and those limbs which I know how to paint and few others even attempt. The mulatto will do very well. I must get fullness. Even though it loses in naturalness, it will gain in richness and beauty. If only it hangs together! O! the smile of the dying man! The look in the mother's eyes! Embraces of despair! Precious realm of painting! That silent power that speaks at first only to the eyes and then seizes and captivates every faculty of the soul!

Writing of a "rhythm, a powerful spiral momentum," a "good black, that happy, rather dirty quality," a wish for "fullness," and that the picture "hang together," he voices a wish for formal coherence. He wants the highlights, middle tones, shapes and lines of his picture to be united in a plastic arrangement on the surface, a design expressive in its own right by virtue of the interrelations, the arabesque. But then he mentions "the smile of the dying man! The look in the mother's eyes!" Thus does he readily put his formal concerns next to extra-formal concerns that must be called literary, that revolve around a newsworthy event and popular cause of the day and his own peculiar glamour and glitter of violence and devastation, and that are incorporated, to his way of thinking, in the spiral momentum, the rather dirty quality and fullness—the hanging together. It does not seem he would agree with, or likely even understand, a point of view that wants him to be engrossed in form while disregarding the rest. Yet his words indicate how he relates form to the rest, for painting is a realm that speaks at first *only* to the eyes, then captivates *every* faculty of the soul. Formal interest is followed, in the viewer's mind, as well as in Delacroix's, by other interests as the meaning of the work expands and unfolds.

Nor does this rather discordant amalgam—this wrapping extra-formal concerns into a multi-tiered constellation—apply to the visual arts only. Any work of art may encompass factors from other arts, or from ostensibly remote fields of endeavor. Any work may have story-telling, symbolism or discursive achievements from science and abstract reasoning as a secondary content, ancillary to its formal core, contributing to the image we take from it, an associated though divergent content. Beethoven wanted his sixth symphony, the *Pasorale*, to convey the sylvan countryside, a peasant gathering, a storm. A performance of Tchaikovsky's *Swan Lake* contains not only movement on a stage, set to music, but a drawn-out, intricate tale of magic and love. A Yeats' verse play, *The Only Jealousy of Emer*, has in performance the sound and sense of its poetry, but also masked actors standing for Celtic heroes. In paintings too diverse and numerous to allow short mention, we find religious symbolism, genre scenes, and episodes from

legend and history, to say nothing of ideas taken from geometry and physical investigation, such as those pertinent to linear perspective and the behavior of light.

There may be those who doubt opera is quite legitimate because it blends orchestral music, singing and theater; or who despise what is called program music because the harmony is supposed to be accompanied by mental pictures; or who frown on *Swan Lake* because it is about the shape of movement across the width and depth of an encompassing space but also about the trials and confusions of finding a true mate; or who think linear perspective is to painting an intruder from geometry and optics; or who want poetry to be little more than a play of vocables, a spoken music; or who enjoy the composition of Poussin's *Contenance of Scipio* without wanting to acknowledge his meaning to illustrate Stoicism, his taking the Greek musical modes as suitable for pictorial art, the honorific conferred on him by his contemporaries, who called him "philosopher-painter."² These narrowly discriminating folk are High Formalists. They want to overlook the notion artists of all stripes and times have until recently adhered to, if their works can be taken as exemplifying their views: that constructing a work of art involves gathering diverse matters into a focal image, a trope, within which those matters are at play.

Agree for the sake of this discussion that a literary metaphor is a root art-image, a basic construct from which more elaborate constructs can be extrapolated, and consider this example from *Lady Chatterly's Lover*: "How cold the anemones looked, bobbing their naked white shoulders over crinoline skirts of green," Constance Chatterly notices while wandering through a brilliant spring day.³ The womanly flowers, shivering bravely in the March wind, signal her waking hope and desire for love. Structurally, the incongruous factors of anemones bobbing in the wind and a chilled woman with exposed shoulders wearing a skirt of green are united in the image of flowers as feminine persons. If flowers carpeting the forest floor are the overt topic, the naked-shouldered woman is the outlying contribution, brought to bear on that topic. In that the flowers are feminized, the putative woman made plant-like, both flowers and woman are phenomenally altered. We perceive their character differently when they are combined than when they are apart. Thus does a metaphor transform its constituents, resonate in our affected sensibilities, engage our world of feeling—for we see ourselves in it. And this transformation is multivalent. Focusing on the image, we have in mind the anemones in female dress but are also marginally aware of the flowers and bare-shouldered woman in green as they differently participate. The flowers and woman are gathered into the focal image and mutually changed. We go past them as individuals to the image into which they are folded, but at the same time this image points to its disparate respective sources, and to our own lives.⁴

And so it is on a more munificent and ramified scale with works of art as wholes, in respect to a marriage of formal content and outlying concerns. Thus the image derived from listening to a symphony may include the melodic and harmonic progression but also, marginally, a wispy reverie of wandering the countryside on a summer day. The image derived from a dance may include the sculpting of space by human bodies but also pantomime of a tale told. The image derived from verse dialogue lying silent on the page may include verbal play and sense but also masked actors strutting and declaiming their parts. The image of a painting on a

religious theme, as in an altarpiece, may include the shapes of Mary's raiments fitted to or framed by neighboring shapes but also the blue of her cloak, symbolizing her status as the virgin mother of Christ. The halos of Mary and the Christ child symbolize their sanctity while adding gold to lapis lazuli, and the cosmic tragedy of that penultimate episode, the crucifixion of Christ, is hieratically displayed for churchgoers to ponder, complete with landscape and beautifully orchestrated ensemble of soldiers and worshipers. Poussin's paintings have pictorial order such that Cézanne marveled at but also refer to Stoic renunciation, as in his *Continenence of Scipio*, or the virtue attributed to the Dorain mode, or the courage attributed to the Phrygian.⁵ As for linear perspective, Raphael's use of it for the architecture in his *School of Athens* explicitly imparts to the formal array the rigor of geometry. To the whole image, which includes but is not limited to the formal array, it adds, by implication, the proto-science of optics and an implacable logic, though Raphael abandons that logic when it threatens to distract from the overall impression, as with the two spheres on the right, which he makes circles instead of the ellipses the logic demands. In a determinedly programmatic composition such as Respighi's *Pines of Rome* the plastic relations of the music release the virtual shape of feeling—of impact on what Delacroix was pleased to call the faculties of the soul—and are the primary content; the musically painted scenes of Rome are a secondary content, a tangential narrative and pictorial aspect, standing in tandem with those orchestral sonorities. In a narrative painting such as Delacroix's *Execution of the Doge Marino Faliero*, the vengeance of the state achieving its end (the executioner, his job done, looks toward the opened gates where the populace is rushing in) piquantly re-enforces what is primarily attested, a sensationally voluptuous and bloody splendor.⁶

Which is not to say that the story of the traitorous Doge and his public termination is embodied in the play of subtle whites and brilliant banners, that the expression in the mother's eyes is to be found in the spiral momentum, that the religious significance of Gerard David's crucifixion is lodged in the dynamic set of colored shapes of which the painting is made, that Stoic philosophy is explicitly manifest in Poussin, that the logic of perspective is explained in Raphael's composition or that the mental picture of the Roman consular armies marching on the Capitoline Hill in the piece by Resphigi is synonymous with the sequence of notes and the timbre of the instruments; it is to say, rather, that between the headless corpse and bright banners, the mother's eyes and spiral momentum, the story of Christ and the colored shapes, Stoicism and Poussin's illustration of it, linear perspective and Raphael's visual ode to intellectual endeavors, the marching legions and the timbre of the instruments, there is a rich, diverse, free-floating, association. Nor can these primary and secondary aspects of the art-image be broken apart and the core formal relations contemplated in isolation other than to a limited extent, through an act of will, if one is a High Formalist of fiercely reductionist bent.

"I should be inclined to disagree that the value of the form for us is bound up with recognition of the dramatic idea," Roger Fry wrote in 1920. "It now seems to me possible by a more searching analysis of our experience in front of a work of art to disentangle our reaction to pure form from our reaction to its implied associated ideas."⁷ To this Raphael, Beethoven, Respighi, Gerard David, Tchaikovksy, Poussin, Delacroix and many another past artist might

have objected. They might have said that taking away our reaction to the implied associated ideas is taking away altogether too much.

In the visual arts, the arts with which I'm most familiar, talk of formal excellence has a history dating at least to Vassari, though certainly not in the language of its twentieth-century exegesis. Formalists such as Mecislas Golberg, Maurice Denis, Clive Bell, Roger Fry, Erle Loran, Clement Greenberg and William Rubin perpetuated and isolated this knowledge, though in some later instances narrowly and dogmatically. They helped us recognize in our own time, through a fresh language, that structure is paramount, the rightful core of signification. They understood that distinctly visual qualities such as Delacroix's "powerful spiral momentum," "good black," and "fullness and hanging together" were meaningful in their own right, much as non-programmatic music is meaningful in its own right, through the innate expressive power of such coherences. Their awareness of this meaning, their insistence on its sovereign value, is their great gift to us. Yet they sought to excise from our reaction to form all that they rightly saw was ancillary, but that they therefore deemed extraneous.

If we reflect on what artists of diverse artistic disciplines and backgrounds have included in their image-making, reflect as well on our inclusive, global experience of their works, we find we must reject Fry's argument for "pure" form on these evident grounds: Combining disparate elements in a united image is the work art usually does. If artists are quick to throw diverse factors together, following, willy-nilly, the semantic model of a metaphor, that is because their power of imagination thrives and becomes more comprehensive by these means. Agreeing with Clive Bell, who said that form is intrinsically significant, we are obliged to add that the image thrown off by a work may exceed what is given in the form alone by referring to all sorts of matters having little to do with form per se. "Pure" form, though articulate, can and does combine with much that lays beyond it, in our selves, in our surroundings, in other arts, or that is imported from the discursive realm and converted to artistic ends. Thus the image yielded to our minds can include a newsworthy event, the personality and life of he or she who made the image, philosophical notions, political creeds, military history, the current state of a science, religious dogmas, a tale told, social relations, and personal revelation of the actual world in all its trenchant glory, as is notably the case with Cézanne.

2

"To understand Cézanne is to foresee Cubism," wrote Albert Gleizes and Jean Metzinger in their 1912 book on Cubism.⁸ "The secret aim of the young painters of the extremist schools is to produce pure painting," wrote Guillaume Apollinaire in 1913, also about Cubism.⁹ "Theirs is an entirely new plastic art," he continued. "It is still in its beginnings, and is not yet as abstract as it would like to be." Piet Mondrian, in a writing published in *Circle* in 1937, asserted that, "Gradually art is purifying its plastic means and thus bringing out the relationship between [the universal and the individual] Thus, in our day, the main tendencies appear: the one maintains the figuration, the other eliminates it. While the former employs more or less complicated and particular forms, the later uses simple and neutral form, or, ultimately, the free line and color."

“One can rightly speak of an *evolution in plastic art*,” he presently continued. “It is of the greatest importance to note this fact, for it reveals the true way of art; the path along which we can advance.”¹⁰ And Erle Loran, writing in 1947, followed in Gleize’s and Metzinger’s footprints by saying that Cézanne, “leaves the subject far behind as he penetrates ahead into the world of abstract space that has by now become so widespread in international art,”¹¹

The modernist adventure made of art a progress. The word can mean movement only, it can mean moving purposefully toward an end, and it can mean rising to a higher stage of development, as in historical determinist doctrine, for instance. Here is not the place to attempt even an outline history of a diverse and complex movement that began in some quarters to take historical determinism as its model. Suffice it to say that the men quoted above are only a few among the great many who thought of pure form not only as a discernable extract, not only as a goal, but as a betterment. Form, many were convinced, was in rising motion toward itself, promising a steady advancement, accompanied by a steady stripping away of mist and fog, the extraneous associations that hid a better, a more sharply defined, horizon: and not excluding so large an ambition as spiritual enhancement of the race. And the goal, we see in retrospect, was at least partly realized, if only because so many artists themselves took up the pursuit, chose to position themselves, as they supposed, in the forefront. If Theosophist Mondrian wasn’t ready to abandon the implied ideas isolated by Fry, Frank Stella readily declared, in 1966, during his minimalist phase, “I always get into arguments with people who want to retain the old values in painting—the humanistic values If you pin them down, they always end up asserting that there is something there besides the paint on the canvas. My painting is based on the fact that only what can be seen there *is* there.”¹² Plainly, by 1966, the values espoused by Delacroix in his writings and paintings were open to scorn. Progress of a sort had occurred. But was it the sort that provides a gain?

Of scientific pursuits it can be asserted that this is the case—that new ideas frequently improve on old. Because of better knowledge of insect reproduction we no longer think flies breed from dirt. Because of telescopes and better measurement of interstellar positions, distances and orbits we no longer think the world is the center of the universe, with the stars rotating around it. Because of the sixteenth-century voyages of discovery we no longer think it possible to sail westward from Europe to Asia. Because of studies in anatomy and taxonomy we no longer think whales are fish. Because of the fossil record and carbon dating we no longer think the age of the planet is consistent with the books of Genesis and Deuteronomy. In that these achievements and many others show that science is perfectible, in that fragmentary or flawed truths are, in this realm, constantly replaced with more powerful ones, supported by available evidence, further enlightenment beckons. For every misstep into prejudice and ignorance, there is an inching forward. There is purposeful movement toward an end, that of comprehensive knowledge, and it advances.

To say science incrementally reveals the true state of things (at least from our perspective), and that its achievements are verifiable, is to say science is not like art. For this very reason it is instructive, while discussing progress in the arts, to examine the relation

between an activity involving fact and one involving imagery. Put the question like this: If an art image in its entirety has the structural characteristics of a metaphor, and if that structure signifies what Delacroix called “every faculty of the soul,” or what might existentially be called a state of being, then what is the import, in respect to progress, of images that sport a scientific aspect?

“Painting is but another word for feeling,” wrote John Constable, evoking the affective, primary purpose of the art image, its capacity for the soul. Yet this evidently was not enough, for he was a student of cloud-types and the nascent discipline of meteorology, who also wrote, “Painting is a science, and should be pursued as an inquiry into the laws of nature. Why, then, may not landscape be considered as a branch of natural philosophy, of which pictures are but the experiments?”¹³ His thinking included Rubens and seventeenth-century Dutch landscapists, especially van Ruisdael, the studies of Thomas Forster and probably Luke Howard, who first classified clouds as cirrus, cumulous, and so on, and the expression of feeling, for which painting was but another word.

“[Impressionism],” wrote Camille Pissarro, who, while in London, made it his business to study Constable, “really should be nothing more than a theory of observation.” But then, evoking as did Constable the affective purpose of the art image, he continued, “without entailing the loss of fantasy, freedom, grandeur, all that makes for great art.” A student of the physical properties of color, “But surely it is clear that we could not pursue our studies of light with much assurance if we did not have as a guide the discoveries of Chevreul and other scientists,” he wrote. “. . . Turner and Constable,” he elsewhere wrote, “while they taught us something, showed us in their works that they had no understanding of the *analysis of shadow*” And in a letter written during a painting expedition to Rouen, he wrote, “I am letting my view of the landscape resolve itself. Sensations don’t come all at once.”¹⁴ His thinking included the established practice of small studies done quickly outdoors that Constable made such robust use of, the “sensations” of Empiricist philosophy and science, the writings of Chevreul and also of Ogden Rood, and the fantasy, freedom, grandeur that make for great art.

“We have,” claimed Rood, physicist and author of *Modern Chromatics*, “a set of lenses placed in front of the retina, and so contrived as to cast upon it very delicate and perfect pictures of objects toward which the eye is directed; and it is by their action on the retina that we see. These retinal pictures are, as it were, mosaics, made up from an infinite number of points of light”¹⁵ Rood also spoke of optical mixture, the *mélange optique* to be found in Charles Blanc, author of the *Grammaire des arts du dessin*. Charles Seurat, familiar with Blanc and Rood, substituted spots of pigment for points of light, conceived his pictures as “retinal mosaics,” and believed the optical blending of his divided pigments was analogous to a blending of myriad spots into uniform tones on the retina. Such, at any rate, can be inferred from a typically abbreviated remark in his only testament, the *esthétique* of 1890: “Given the phenomenon of the duration of the luminous impression on the retina, synthesis is logically the result.”¹⁶

The imagery of Constable and Pissarro pertains to cloud types and the color of shadows, a method for rendering these, consistent with the painting culture prevalent in England and France (as modified for their needs), and borrowings from logical discourse and empirical

investigation, converted for the uses of painting, incongruous but enabling. When these borrowings are brought to bear on clouds, shadows, and methods of rendering them, they assist in creating the image, the trope, to which all aspects are married, within which all are mutually transformed. As for Seurat, *Un dimanche à la Grande Jatte* takes as its ostensible subject the park, the boats, the people, their pets and stylish accouterments, but rigorously applies to it a painter's adaptation of *Modern Chromatics*, fusing these disparate sources in an image that rises from the semantic structure of painting itself—relations of shape, tone, hue, edge, placement, the typical concerns. The subject of people on the riverbank and the science laid out in *Modern Chromatics* are subsidiary to a *facture*, in which both are joined. The painting's pointillist structure contains, by implication, a discourse borrowed from another sphere—a discourse standing beyond the image and not immediately apparent in it yet relentlessly shaping what the spectator sees.

Rood's conviction that retinal pictures are what we see has, as it happens, been discredited. "Because our eyes are in constant motion, the retinal image is an abstraction," current thinking holds.¹⁷ Nor for essentially the same reason does current psychology favor the Empiricist concept that sensations write knowledge on the mind as on a blank sheet of paper. The optical mixture Seurat believed in has fared poorly as well. Recent scholarship supports what our eyes frankly tell us, that it occurs only with very fine dots, as in photo-mechanical reproduction, and is experienced only somewhat while looking at the *Grande Jatte* or any other Divisionist work.¹⁸

Constable learned from the classification of cloud-types to make his skies, compared to van Ruisdael's, more varied and specific. For his shadows, though, Constable learned from van Ruisdael's (and Rubens') unrivaled ability to suggest a full range of hues with a few earth colors, plus black and white. In respect to color, he followed the established scheme of middle-tones, darks and lights, treating his shadows, within this traditional harmony, as tonal variants. Pissarro, in contrast, learned from his study of the physics of light to paint shadows by analyzing their constituent hues. Having profited from Rood and Chevreul, he knew each color apparent in nature was made up of several, reflected in different quantities; he had at his disposal intense, new pigments van Ruisdael and Rubens lacked; and in his later life, having tried and abandoned Divisionism, he nonetheless was inclined to render shadows with many bright touches.

From van Ruisdael's treatment of clouds to Constable's treatment of clouds and from Constable's treatment of the color of shadows to Pissarro's (and Seurat's) treatment of the color of shadows we can easily trace advances in objective knowledge. The classification of clouds by meteorologists and the analysis of light by physicists are discoveries that increase our understanding of the actual world, compared to the former state of knowledge. But have we discarded van Ruisdael's paintings because Constable's are more meteorologically accurate, discarded Constable's because Pissarro's are more alert to nuances of color and light discernable in nature, discarded Pissarro's because "sensations" are inadequate to our present understanding of how vision occurs, discarded Seurat's masterpiece because the melange optique is not quite as Seurat hoped? Certainly not. Despite changes of color resulting from unstable pigments, despite

revised understanding of the retinal image and optical mixture, the luster of Grande Jatte is untarnished; and to the paintings of van Ruisdael, Constable and Pissarro the same lasting polish applies. To an other than scientific mode of thinking these works of art centrally belong. Unlike the rusted hulks of the scientific junkyard, they are indispensable, continuing to reverberate in our culture, in the virtual museum of triumphs to which we all proudly lay claim.

A reason for this apparent disconnect between a scientific content that grows outdated and a whole content that long remains viable has already been given. Form pertains to feeling, its content is existential, it speaks to momentary states of being, to the affective integration of the self with its body and surroundings, and whether feeling has discernibly progressed over thousands of years is much to be doubted. To other mammals we are cousin. Our inter-organic rhythms are presumed similar to theirs, and our back-brain passions continue volcanic through the ages, a florescence of being, carried down from primate ancestors. Rage, bliss, jealousy, lust, revulsion, rapture, depression, envy, calm, dread, ease, panic, hatred: in our ongoing sagas the ancient, atavistic, apish heritage lives on. Though the environment in which our communal and individual lives of feeling transpire has been radically altered by science applied, by tools and machines, with the result that our animal responses are sometimes geared to new objects and new, clock-driven routines of school, factory, store and office, we still defecate, eat, scratch, sleep, mate, fight, mourn and adore. In respect to feeling, improvement is neither much in evidence nor much to be expected.

“But what had really, and it seemed instantaneously, destroyed her love,” Iris Murdock writes,

was his crushing physical defeat at the hands of Richard. This was unjust, but with the deep dark logical injustice of forces which govern us at our most extreme moments and which, though they have nothing to do with morality, must sometimes be recognized in our lives like gods.¹⁹

In that painting gives concrete, objective form to the wincing, sensuous, seeking, clamoring, ecstatic self—to perennial being—the art aspires, primarily, to express a continuum that abides in human life if not eternally at least over thousands of years. Along with the other arts, it spans culture-to-culture and epoch-to-epoch, transecting the decades. In that a painting can obliquely connote whatever is urgent in the life of the mind, it may connote, secondarily, current states of discourse. It may connote Greco-Roman myths, the geometry of linear perspective, Christian theology, meteorology, the Empiricist tabula rasa of the mind daubed with sensations, the physicists' spectral decomposition of light, the politics of Greek revolt put down by a despotic empire. If science steps out boldly, if discourse in general creeps forward because, at a minimum, we are able over time to productively criticize past thought, and if paintings can partake obliquely of discourse, so can they partake of this displacement of old ideas by ideas that are newer and, eventually, better. But paintings borrow ideas from discourses only in order to fold them into a trope, with the primary purpose of bodying forth how it feels to be who we are, in the world we inhabit. So advances in painting are entirely of a representational sort. Discourse is incorporated in imagery, and is transformed.

Of progress in the arts it may be concluded that style responds to previous style and falls into further permutations of style, often consistent with permutations of politics, religion, philosophy and science, with attendant shifts in what is signified. Yet, having stood in wonder, in the revelation of staggering beauty, before the Nereids in the British Museum, carved in 380 BC, one doubts these changes have raised us, 2,387 years later, to a more enlightened state. The total image a work projects may well connote a discursive content that hovers beyond, a secondary factor implicated in its construction while standing outside our immediate ken, so that we may enjoy, in our regard of it, something of the intellect pursuing its political, religious and scientific goals. Yet, in the end, the old gods live on. The arts circle the human condition again and again. There is progress, to be sure, for art-making ever soldiers on as the treasure of human meanings wonderfully heaps up, but it is progress that proliferates rather than ascends, a progress without improvement.

¹Notes

- . Eugene Delacroix, *The Journal of Eugene Delacroix*, trans., Lucy Norton, ed. Hubert Willington (Phaidon Press, 1980), p. 38.
- ². “These paintings [of Poussin’s] cannot be properly understood if they are considered in formal terms only, and in order to realize the artists’ intention, it will be necessary to examine in some detail his general ideas and those of the friends among whom he lived and for whom he painted.” (Anthony Blunt, *Nicolas Poussin* (Bollingen Foundation, 1967) p. 160.)
- ³. D. H. Lawrence, *Lady Chatterley’s Lover* (Grove Press, 1959), p. 98.
- ⁴. For this analysis I’m indebted to Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch, *Meaning* (University of Chicago Press, 1975), chapters 2, 3, 4
- ⁵. See Blunt, *Nicolas Poussin*, pp. 226-227.
- ⁶. We know about the populace at the gates only because of Byron’s verse drama, “Marino Faliero, Doge of Venice: An Historical Tragedy.” Delacroix, with his usual circumspection, keeps the mob offstage—for good reason. If secondary concerns dominate formal ones, a work is derailed. Viewers’ attention is deflected to the story or doctrine being illustrated. How wise of Raphael to paint the spheres in his *School of Athens* as circles rather than ovals, so as to imply the rational laws of geometric projection while keeping them at bay. As to music, it is perhaps to be said against Respighi’s *Pines of Rome* that the program is insistent and distracting. For a discussion of Byron and Delacroix’s painting, see Lee Johnson, *The Painting of Eugene Delacroix: A Critical Catalogue*, vol. 1. (The Clarendon Press, 1981), pp. 99-100.
- ⁷. Judith Wechsler, *The Interpretation of Cezanne* (UMI Research Press, 1972), p. 32.
- ⁸. Edward Fry, *Cubism* (New York and Toronto, 1966), p. 105.
- ⁹. Guillaume Apollinaire, *The Cubist Painters*, trans. Lionel Abel (Wittenborn, Schultz, 1949), p. 13.
- ¹⁰. Piet Mondrian, “Plastic Art and Pure Plastic Art,” *Modern Artists on Art: Ten Unabridged Essays*, ed. Robert L. Herbert (Prentice Hall, 1964), pp. 116; 117.
- ¹¹. Erle Loran, *Cezanne’s Composition: Analysis of His Form with Diagrams and Photographs of His Motifs* (University of California Press, 1985), p. 117.
- ¹². Bruce Glaser, “Questions For Stella and Judd,” *Art News*, vol. 6, no. 5 (September, 1966), p. 55.
- ¹³. Basil Taylor, *Constable: Paints, Drawings and Watercolours* (Phaidon Press, 1973), p. 231.
- ¹⁴. Camille Pissarro, *Letters to His Son*, ed., John Rewald (Paul P. Appel, 1972), pp. 23, 99, 295, 356.
- ¹⁵. Ogden N. Rood, *Students’ Text-book of Color; or Modern Chromatics* (D. Appleton and Company, 1879), p. 10.
- ¹⁶. Robert L. Herbert, *Georges Seurat: 1859-1891* (New York: The Metropolitan Museum of Art, 1991), p. 382. The full passage in this, the fourth draft, including words and phrases crossed out (in square brackets), is rendered by Herbert as follows: “Given the phenomenon [that] of the duration of the luminous impression on the retina [are the same], [The means of expression will be synthetic.] Synthesis is logically the result.”
- ¹⁷. Nicholas Wade and Michael Swanston, *Visual Perception: an Introduction*, London and New York, 1991, page 191.
- ¹⁸. See Carson J. Webster, “The Technique of Impressionism: A Reappraisal,” *The College Art Journal*, vol. IV, no. 1 (Nov. 1944), pp 3 – 22.
- ¹⁹. Iris Murdoch, *The Nice and the Good* (Viking Press, 1958), p. 39.